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Action on Climate Change: What Does It
Mean and Where Does It Lead To?
Rob D. van den Berg and Lee Cando-Noordhuizen
Abstract In 2014, the second conference on evaluating climate change and devel-
opment offered the opportunity to take stock of evaluative evidence of the chal-
lenges, failures and success of climate change action. In 2011 one of the authors
raised the possibility of a micro-macro paradox of climate change action (van den
Berg, Evaluation 17:405, 2011): in his view evaluations of climate change action
provided evidence that climate action works and achieves direct impact – yet
climate change seems unstoppable. Several major, comprehensive evaluations
were presented at the 2014 conference and provided an overview of actions taken
and their successes and failures, as well as obstacles on the way to global impact.
This chapter presents an overview of issues, evidence and the way forward for
evaluators tackling climate action and sustainable development. The evidence
provides support for the micro-macro paradox of 2011 and indicates that the global
community has the technology and knowledge on how to stop climate change.
However, actions that promote climate change still outweigh remedial climate
action with at least a factor of 100. Thus current successes of programs and projects
will not impact global trends, unless at the same time the non-sustainable subsidies
and actions are stopped.
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2.1 Introducing the Micro-Macro Paradox: Success at
the Micro-level Does Not Lead to Success at
the Macro-level?
In development economics the question whether aid contributed to economic
growth was hotly debated after Mosley (1987, 139ff) identified this as the
“micro-macro” paradox. He could not find any statistically significant correlation
between development aid and the economic growth rate of recipient countries,
taking into account other factors that cause growth. Mosley defended aid nonethe-
less, as benefits at the micro level were often shown to be substantial and essential.
Nevertheless, economic growth was supposed to be the engine of future develop-
ment that would make aid unnecessary, and if aid would not contribute to economic
development, it could turn out to be ineffective in the longer run and not have
meaning beyond just the benefits of a specific and localized project or intervention.
Even if a project has significant short term outcomes, but it did not contribute to
economic growth, it could be argued that the sustainability of its benefits are
questionable.
A second milestone in this discussion was reached in 1998 with the publication
of the World Bank report on “Assessing aid: what works, what doesn’t and why?”
(Dollar and Prichett 1998), which focused on the role of aid in reducing poverty,
and rekindled the micro-macro paradox discussion, as it better identified when aid
could potentially contribute to economic growth: when countries had good policies,
good governance and management and well-functioning institutions. The ensuing
debate in development economics revived the micro-macro paradox, until in (2010)
Arndt, Jones and Tarp aimed to close the arguments by demonstrating a positive
and statistically significant causal effect of aid on growth in poor countries over the
long run. “There is no micro-macro paradox”, they conclude (p. 27). What is
interesting in their analysis is that they attribute their success in demonstrating
evidence for growth to “methodological advances in the programme evaluation
literature”, which have “improved the profession’s capacity to identify causal
effects in economic phenomena” (p. 26).
Evaluation methodology thus has helped to solve the micro-macro paradox in
development economics, according to Arndt, Jones and Tarp. If we accept that, let
us explore whether evaluation methodology is also able to help us in solving the
paradox of successful climate change interventions, versus a devastating trend of
global warming and associated climate variability that does not appear to be
influenced by climate change interventions.
The opportunity for a broad perspective on this issue presented itself at the 2nd
International Conference on Evaluating Climate Change and Development, where
several comprehensive evaluations of Climate Change aid were presented. They
offered an opportunity for a meta-analysis of the results of some of the largest
public sector efforts to address climate change in developing countries. Of special
interest is whether these evaluations offer any hope regarding the micro-macro
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paradox of climate interventions that make a local difference but do not seem to
impact at the global level.
Seven comprehensive evaluations will be assessed and the evidence they present
of the discrepancy between micro and macro impact will be judged. The first four
were presented at the 2nd International Conference on Evaluating Climate Change
and Development; the last three were added as they emerged in the same year and
complement the picture:
1. The Fifth Overall Performance Study of the Global Environment Facility,
undertaken by the Independent Evaluation Office of the GEF;
2. The Independent Evaluation of the Climate Investment Funds, undertaken by
ICF International on behalf of the five independent evaluation departments of the
multilateral development banks;
3. The evaluation of climate change support in the Inter-American Development
Bank, conducted by the Office of Evaluation and Oversight of the IDB;
4. The evaluation of the effectiveness of Swiss International Cooperation in cli-
mate change, conducted by a consortium led by Gaia Consulting Oy for the
Swiss Agency for Development and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs;
5. The real-time evaluation of initiatives of the Asian Development Bank to
support access to climate finance, implemented by the Independent Evaluation
Department of the ADB;
6. The real-time evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative
(NICFI), undertaken by a consortium led by LTS International;
7. The external evaluation of the UN-REDD programme (Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries).
Furthermore, we will also include the older but still highly relevant climate
change evaluations of the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank (World
Bank/IEG 2009, 2010, 2012), as well as the Fourth Overall Performance Study of
the Global Environment Facility (GEF/EO 2010), the precursor to OPS5.
2.2 The Micro-Macro Paradox: Successful Climate Action
But No Global Impact?
The micro-macro paradox of successful environmental interventions was raised by
one of the authors in a keynote address at the Second Global Assembly of the
International Development Evaluation Association in Amman, Jordan, on 14 April
2011 (van den Berg 2011). The argument is that a sizeable proportion of interven-
tions were demonstrated to have direct and long-term impact in the sense of
achieving lasting success in for example reducing greenhouse gas emissions from
a specific source, but they have made no impact on global environmental trends,
that have continued their downward slide. This is the case for climate change, for
the historical loss of biodiversity that is now increasingly seen as a human caused
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mass extinction to be compared with the extinction of dinosaurs 65 million years
ago, and for the increasing pollution of our environment with chemical substances,
which endanger human health and the health of our habitat.1
A first indication of the paradox and its solution emerged in the comprehensive
evaluations of the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The GEF was established as
(interim) financial instrument of the main environmental conventions resulting
from the 1992 Earth Summit, on climate change (UNFCCC), biodiversity (CBD)
and some of the various conventions on chemicals (most notably Stockholm). For
more than two decades it had been the core organization for support to developing
countries and countries with economies in transition, raising a considerable amount
of funding itself, and as a co-funding agency, an even larger amount from other
sources. The GEF is replenished every 4 years by its donors. One of the important
documents of this replenishment is an independent comprehensive evaluation of the
performance of the institution up to that time. In the fourth Overall Performance
Study (OPS4) of the GEF some elements of the micro-macro paradox were first
explored (GEF/EO 2010). Interventions financed by the GEF had started in 1992
and the 2010 Overall Performance Study was the first to be able to report on the
longer term impact of these interventions. OPS4 concluded that the processes set in
motion by GEF co-funded projects were progressing toward longer term impact,
provided follow-up actions were taken by countries and stakeholders. Nevertheless,
global environmental trends continued to “spiral downward” (conclusion 1, p. 15).
A first indication of why this was the case was provided in a calculation of the
purchasing power of GEF funds over time: the fourth replenishment of the GEF,
while nominally higher than the first replenishment, represented 83% of the value
of the first replenishment, while at the same time funding needs had increased
dramatically (p. 16–18).
The Fifth Overall Performance Study of the GEF (GEF/IEO 2014) provides
more details to the same arguments. It concludes again that environmental trends
“continue to decline” (p. 10), whereas the “intervention logic of the GEF is catalytic
and successful in achieving impact over time” (p. 13). Like OPS4, the evaluation
focuses on funding levels to explain the paradox between evidence of impact and
declining global trends. This time the context is broadened and includes public
funding that leads to environmental decline. At the time of OPS5, annual commit-
ments of the GEF had reached the level of US$ 1 billion. Overall public funding for
environmental support to developing countries had reached the level of US$
10 billion annually. However, funding needs for action on global environmental
issues “are conservatively assessed as at least US$ 100 billion annually” (p. 17).
Thus a funding gap emerges that in itself provides an explanation of the paradox.
1Rijk, van Duursen and van den Berg (2016). Health cost that may be associated with Endocrine
Disrupting Chemicals: an inventory, evaluation and way forward to assess the potential socio-
economic impact of EDC-associated health effects in the EU. University of Utrecht. They
calculate the cost in 2028 in the EU from €46 to 288 billion per year, if no action is taken. This
is just one example of a particular type of chemical substance; new chemical substances are
introduced in food and packaging every year.
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However, “global public funding of at least US$ 1 trillion annually is available for
(. . .) unsustainable environmental practices, such as subsidies for fossil fuels”
(p. 17). In other words, the GEF is ten times out-funded by others, whereas ten
times more than overall public funding for global environmental public goods is
required, and ten times more than that is actually spent through public funding on
subsidies that destroy our environment. The paradox is thus revealed as a veridical
paradox2: a seeming conflict between impact of GEF versus impact on global
environmental trends, that is resolved if competing funding channels are taking
into account.3
The questions we pose in this chapter are whether the other comprehensive
evaluations provide further evidence for this; whether the historical path that the
GEF has followed to arrive at this situation has been matched by others, or whether
they have been able to tackle the barriers to impact; and whether their specific
routes offer insights into what may be done to increase the chances of success at
systems level – i.e. whether they provide insights into what works, when and where,
for whom and under what circumstances to achieve success in humanity’s efforts to
address the potentially disastrous consequences of climate change over time.
2.3 From Early Results to the Slow Materialization
of Impact
In the years leading up to OPS5 the project portfolio of interventions supported by
the GEF has matured over time, since its inception in 1992, to enable a judgment on
the effectiveness and impact of these interventions. The First and Second Overall
Performance Studies of the GEF were not able to provide comprehensive assess-
ments of the results and impact of the GEF, due to the fact that many interventions
had just been completed or were still on-going at the time of the evaluations4 (this
paragraph based on ICF 2005, 21–22). The Third Overall Performance Study was
expected to be the first to report on results and impact, and it had to disappoint its
readers on impact. It was able to report on results, as these were mostly at the
outcome level. On longer term impact the OPS3 team was confronted with “general
unavailability of impact-level results data” (ICF 2005, 21). Several reasons were
identified why these data were unavailable: lack of an overall results measurement
framework including baselines, indicators and targets; lack of efforts at the project
2As defined by the logician W.V. Quine (1966) in The Ways of Paradox and other essays.
New York: Random House: a veridical paradox is a statement that seems to contradict itself but
may nonetheless be true.
3For an update on energy subsidies alone, see IMF Working Paper 15/105 How large are Global
Energy Subsidies? by David Coady, Louis Sears and Baoping Shang, that estimates subsidies and
related costs to be higher than $5 trillion in 2015.
4This paragraph based on ICF, 2005, 21–22.
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level to generate data; lack of systematic efforts to conduct “end-of-project”
evaluations and perhaps most importantly: the time horizon. Whereas GEF projects
on average take no longer than 5 years, environmental change may take decades
before it becomes measurable (ICF 2005, 22). However, OPS3 noted with muted
optimism that monitoring and evaluation had become more important in the GEF
and there was evidence of growing harmonization of goals and processes across the
GEF (ICF 2005, 12). We will see these themes return in other organizations and
their evaluations.
The Climate Investment Funds (CIF), initiated in 2008, were set up to overcome
two obstacles that the GEF had to face: slow procedures and fragmentation of
funding. The GEF had to spread its contributions over a large group of countries
(more than 150) and not just in climate change, but in other priority areas such as
biodiversity, international waters and persistent organic pollutants. The slow imple-
mentation of GEF interventions, also led to time delays in achieving impact, while
time is of the essence in the fight against climate change. The CIF would focus on a
relatively small number of countries, to enable it to provide higher levels of
funding, “potentially allowing greater impact” (ICF 2014, viii) and it would
apply a “light touch” approach to ensure quick decision making – relying on the
multilateral development banks to provide the technical expertise to design, review
and implement projects. However, up to May 2014 only a small proportion – about
9% – of the approved funding had been disbursed to action on the ground (ICF, vii).
The evaluation notes in 2014 that “most CIF projects are still on the drawing board
or in early execution” (ICF, viii) and thus the effort to speed up procedures in
comparison to the GEF largely failed. Failure to overcome the second barrier of
insufficient funding to achieve longer term impact cannot yet be ascertained: the
question cannot yet be answered.
Yet “transformative impact is a major goal of the CIF, and a justifiable one”
(ICF, x). The evaluation notes that CIF resources, even though more focused and
considerably higher than the GEF’s in its partner countries, “are small relative to
global needs”, so they need to be focused on countries and on activities where they
will be able to support transformative change. However, the evaluation also notes
that many of the CIFs activities lack a convincing theory of change that provides a
clear picture of how broader adoption would be achieved. On the positive side the
evaluation commends the CIF for its learning and piloting objectives, and notes the
“vast potential” for providing knowledge on how countries can respond to the
challenge of climate change (ICF, xii).
The evaluations of climate change efforts of the World Bank Group go back in
time from 2009 (when the first study was published) to 2012 (when the third report
was published on the IEG website). They refer to a much broader and older
portfolio of activities that the Bank implemented, many of which were undertaken
with co-funding from the GEF. The longer term impact on several areas of work
could be evaluated. However, the primary focus of many interventions was often on
aspects such as support for energy policies, deforestation, low carbon technologies,
and adaptation, and differed in how they related to climate change. The emerging
picture is thus less straight-forward than the GEF assessment. Nevertheless, the
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three World Bank evaluations provide indirect support for the paradox and some
hopeful signs of where the paradox may be solved.
First and foremost, the evaluations identify energy efficiency as a crucial
pathway towards climate action that potentially funds itself.5 Well guided efforts
toward energy efficiency tend to have economic returns that dwarf those of most
other development projects, while at the same time resulting in lower greenhouse
gas emissions. Especially the second evaluation (World Bank 2010, p. 32) identifies
several promising avenues: efficient lighting that offers very high economic returns
and significant emission reductions; reducing losses in the transmission and distri-
bution of energy; large-scale efforts in energy efficiency may reduce the need for
power plants (World Bank 2010, p. xv). The 2010 evaluation was one of the first to
provide evaluative evidence that energy subsidies are “expensive, damage the
climate and benefit the rich” (World Bank 2010, p. 119).
These findings in the World Bank/IEG evaluations (most notably the second
evaluation) were further supported by evaluative evidence from the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
GEF. In a briefing note the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the multilateral banks
noted strong evidence from independent evaluations that6:
• Energy efficiency investments are highly cost-effective;
• Fossil fuel subsidies discourage energy efficiency;
• The financial sector can be persuaded to provide energy efficiency loans;
• Genuine demonstration projects can transform markets;
• Biases against energy efficiency projects can be overcome.
However, presenting this evidence to the climate change negotiators could to
some extent be characterized as “preaching to the converted” and the evidence for
these points still needs to sway governments to reduce fossil fuel subsidies and
promote energy efficiency.
The Inter-American Development Bank’s 2014 evaluation of its climate change
strategy notes that the IDB has seen its largest contribution to greenhouse gas
emission reductions from its support for renewable energy investments (mainly
hydropower – IDB 2014, p. 34), rather than energy efficiency in which the Bank has
not been as active. The 2014 evaluation aligns the IDB with the earlier ECG
briefing note in suggesting that “improvements in energy efficiency have perhaps
the greatest potential impact in reducing GHG emissions at the lowest costs”, for
which energy subsidies “remain a key barrier” (IDB 2014, p. x). A second sector
that turned out to be highly relevant for climate change was transportation: bus
5IEG [2016]. Four myths about climate change. Webtext accompanying the publication of the
three Climate Change and the World Bank Group reports. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/topic/
climate-change, accessed May 9 2016.
6ECG (2011). Overcoming barriers to energy efficiency: new evidence from independent evalua-
tion. S.l., Evaluation Cooperation Group. [Briefing note, November 23, 2011.] This note was
presented to the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) of the UN Framework Convention for
Climate Change, held from 28 November to 9 December 2011 in Durban, South Africa.
2 Action on Climate Change: What Does It Mean and Where Does It Lead To? 19
rapid transport systems and road projects, where especially the former have con-
tributed to greenhouse gas emissions.
However, a lack of clear classification of climate change related activities and
investments, as well as the lack of a transparent measurement system for green-
house gas emission reductions, caused considerable difficulties in identifying which
projects and loans of the Bank were of relevance for its climate change strategy and
how much they contributed. The IDB climate change strategy was approved in
2011 to bring activities together that are relevant for climate change and to
approach them in a more systematic way, to enable mainstreaming and upscaling.
While the activities themselves have considerable history in the IDB, their rela-
tionship to climate change goals has been relatively recent. The benefit of an older
portfolio is that it enables a look at finished projects, even if this means extra efforts
to reconstruct what its specific contribution to climate change mitigation was.
Compared to the CIF evaluation, the IDB evaluation is able to provide evaluative
evidence on effectiveness, though longer term impact remains elusive due to
measurement problems (IDB 2014, p. x). The Independent Evaluation Department
of the Asian Development Bank in its real-time evaluation of the ADB’s initiatives
to support access to climate finance also noted the difficulty of assessing the climate
impact of activities that may have other primary objectives and the lack of a
consistent framework for measuring greenhouse gas emission reductions
(ADB/IED 2014, p. xi).
The evaluation of the Swiss International Cooperation in Climate Change from
2000 to 2012 develops the same argument for the portfolio of interventions it
looked at. The focus on climate change is relatively new in Swiss cooperation,
and many of the older projects were formulated and implemented from develop-
ment and poverty alleviation perspectives. As a result, no consistent data sets are
available to measure the impact of especially the earlier interventions on climate
change (Gaia Consulting 2014, p. 9). Yet the portfolio scores high on effectiveness,
showing “moderate to strong” effectiveness in reducing greenhouse gas emissions
and increasing people’s abilities to cope with the impacts of climate change
(Ibidem, p. 5). Due to the methodological challenges in evaluating a portfolio that
emerged from other objectives, but is now seen as central to climate change efforts,
the evaluation is reduced to noting that there are “numerous examples of successful
emission reductions” but no overall picture emerging.
Norway’s support to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Deg-
radation (REDDþ) through Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative
(NICFI) has been evaluated in 2013 in a summative evaluation, looking at what had
been achieved so far. This support has similarities with the CIFs in that funding is
aimed to achieve impact through focusing on a few countries, so that the amounts of
funding become catalytic. The evaluation concludes that the portfolio is “providing
a substantial, direct contribution towards the conservation of natural forests” (LTS
International et al. 2014, p. xxii), and that it is “likely” that this will lead to higher
level and long term impact, as the supported activities contribute to “sustainable
development” (LTS, p. xxiv). Yet this would be dependent on future funding, which
is uncertain – it is this lack of certainty that the evaluation proclaims to be the
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“single greatest risk” to the sustainability of the REDDþ initiatives. Important to
note is that greater coherence and consistency has been achieved in measuring
greenhouse gas emission reductions – the deciding factor no doubt was that this
support was set up as climate change support from the beginning (see LTS, p. xxx).
The picture emerging from the Norwegian evaluation is complemented by the
independent evaluation of the UN-REDDþ programme, undertaken in 2014. This
evaluation concludes that the programme has been moderately successful in deliv-
ering outputs, whereas its overall (programme) effectiveness is rated as moderately
unsatisfactory (Frechette 2014, p. iv). Its efficiency is rated as unsatisfactory: the
three UN partners in UN-REDDþ continue to have their separate procedures,
which leads to inefficiency in the management of the programme (Frechette, p. 30).
We may draw the following conclusions from this overview of the findings of
the seven comprehensive evaluations, which are presented in Table 2.1 First of all,
three conditions at the portfolio level emerge for an evaluation to be able to provide
evidence of direct impact and of impact at the global level:
1. Only funding agencies that have steadily built a coherent portfolio focused on
climate change can expect evaluative evidence on the impact of this portfolio;
portfolio’s that are gathered from interventions with other aims as primary
objective tend to show a lack of data related to climate change, different
interpretations of what should be done and a wider range of activities to achieve
outputs.
2. The portfolio needs to be coherent and mature to find solid evidence of direct
impact; this is the case for the GEF only. The UN-REDDþ evaluation managed
to gather evidence on the “likelihood” of impact and sustainability.
3. Only the GEF and UN-REDDþ have a consistent set of instructions for mea-
suring greenhouse gas emission reductions. These instructions are still under
development and will no doubt further improve over time; but they make it
possible to aggregate GHG reductions at the portfolio level. The IDB, ADB and
the Swiss Cooperation evaluations faced difficulties for using GHG reduction
data because of the lack of coherence in the portfolio, with interventions now
counted as important for climate change which were not set up for this purpose
originally. Even though their portfolios are mature, they do not lend themselves
to providing evidence at the impact level, as the lack of comparable data leads to
problems of aggregation that cannot be overcome, at least not until the portfolios
have matured further and measurement norms and standards are agreed.
The first important element of the micro-macro paradox is evident in the
judgments on efficiency and effectiveness. Where these were rated, efficiency
was deemed to be low or unsatisfactory. Where effectiveness was rated, evidence
pointed in the direction of moderately satisfactory to fully satisfactory outputs. On
the direct impact level, of amounts of GHG emission reductions in the new
situation, only the GEF provided evidence at the portfolio level, but other evalua-
tions certainly provided evidence at the intervention level, such as the IDB, ADB,
and Swiss Cooperation. The only discrepancy in findings emerged between the
NICFI and UN-REDDþ evaluations, where the Norwegian evaluation found a
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“likelihood of higher level and longer term impact”, but the UN-REDDþ evalua-
tion rated the same as “moderately unsatisfactory”. Although the NICFI and
UN-REDDþ evaluations overlap to a large extent (NICFI being the biggest
donor to REDDþ initiatives), the difference may be due to a willingness or
reluctance to look into the future. On global level impact the evaluations that
were willing to enter into a somewhat reflective and speculative mode – i.e. the CIF
and NICFI evaluations – came to similar conclusions as the GEF, that funding in
these climate change initiatives remains relatively small to global needs and may
also be unpredictable – thus putting a huge question mark on the global level impact
of climate change interventions.
The main thesis of the Fifth Overall Performance Study of the GEF, that success
at the micro level is not leading to a change in trends at the macro level because of
funding issues, is thus supported in the CIF and NICFI evaluations. Various
elements are mentioned in the funding gap: the subsidies for non-sustainable use
of natural resources which are substantially higher than funding of international
action against climate change; the relative low amount of funding versus the
identified global needs; and the unpredictability of funding in the coming years.
The core of the micro-macro paradox is further substantiated in the older World
Bank evaluations and the briefing note that the Evaluation Cooperation Group of
the multilateral banks developed for COP17 in Durban in 2010.
2.4 Surviving the Negative Effects of Climate Change
While the onslaught of climate change continues unabated, the relevance and
urgency of adaptation to changing circumstances has been increasing. While this
is still questioned in developed countries where climate change deniers hold office,
many if not all developing countries are working on national priority and action
plans for adaptation to climate change. While support for adaptation did not figure
prominently in the early years of climate action after the Earth Summit in 1992, it
has come to the foreground and is now seen as of equal importance as mitigation in
guidance of the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change. The international
portfolio for support to countries on adaptation is not as mature as the portfolio on
mitigation. Furthermore, international agreement on a comprehensive framework
for adaptation – what adaptation is, what it would be composed of and how it should
be measured – is still developing. While UNFCCC and the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change have done important work in providing a first understanding of
adaptation and how countries can develop national priority plans for adaptation
action, evaluations have not yet delivered a critical mass of evaluative evidence.
It could be argued that it is not necessary to look at adaptation from a global
perspective. To adapt or not adapt is not something that happens on a global scale.
While greenhouse gas emissions lead to climate change for the globe, adaptation is
by definition more local – if one country is well adapted, it does not lead to better
adaptation in its neighboring countries. Furthermore, while greenhouse gas
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emissions can be measured through technical processes, there is no similar mea-
surement for adaptation. No single indicator for adaptation will suffice. We argue
that adaptation has at least three distinct dimensions: (1) changes in social and
economic development that ensure that the outputs and outcomes are sustainable
from a climate change perspective; (2) preparedness for and dealing with natural
disasters that may increase in intensity due to climate change; (3) resilience of
populations and societies to tackle unexpected changes in the natural environment
that they are living in. The first dimension increasingly overlaps with mitigation
action. While mitigation may be primarily directed at reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, the micro-macro paradox establishes clearly that for these actions to be
ultimately successful, systems need to change and become environmentally sus-
tainable. This is the route towards durable emission reductions, and it is also the
route towards increased adaptive capacity. For this reason we see an increasing use
of the same transformative mechanisms for adaptation as for mitigation.
Adaptation and mitigation are two different but linked dimensions in social,
economic and environmental sustainability. Adaptation concerns the ways in which
the social and economic domains are “ready” for change in the environmental
domain, and includes resulting actions. Mitigation focuses on one particular way
society and the economy use natural resources and aims to make this use environ-
mentally sustainable. Adaptation perspectives in mitigation often are termed “cli-
mate proofing” of actions; ensuring that the mitigation interventions will be
resilient against climate change. Both adaptation and mitigation ultimately require
action that transforms the interaction between the social, economic and environ-
mental domains. One of us argued that sustainability is fundamentally an adaptation
issue (van den Berg 2014, p. 34–35): “achieving a sustainable balance among civil
society, the economy and the environment will require constant adaptation”. In this
light we include some of the evaluative evidence on adaptation in our discussion of
transformative action.
2.5 Three Priority Areas for Transformative Action
The seven evaluations and their predecessors also provide much information and
evaluative evidence on how transformative processes can be set in motion and what
is essential for these processes. A coherent picture emerges of action at the country
level, from civil society, the private sector and the government; action which
requires legal and regulatory amendments and changes in markets and behaviour
in society; of engaging with civil society which collaborates or is the main actor for
behaviour change; of engaging with the private sector which introduces new
solutions and technologies that could together with changed behaviour lead to
market change and transformation. A crucial cross-cutting issue is whether activ-
ities take gender, equity and inclusiveness into account, as they are essential to
ensure the transformation will not just have an economic and environmental, but
also a social impact. For this reason the next section of this chapter discusses briefly
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the interaction with civil society through the example of small grants provided to
local communities, the introduction of new technology in collaboration with the
private sector and the gender, equity and inclusiveness dimensions.
2.6 Civil Society Action Supported Through Small Grants
While civil society is active at all levels of governance, including the global level, it
tends to be rooted in local organizations and action. Bottom-up action and repre-
sentation are considered essential by many civil society organisations. Change in
behaviour initiated by and in civil society often follows its own dynamics – some of
it top-down, where governments impose rules and regulations, or behavior is
modelled on the example of popular characters or opinion leaders, but often durable
change is initiated at local levels and gradually (or quickly) spreading to the general
population. Of the organisations evaluated the Global Environment Facility has
supported local civil society initiatives through its Small Grant Programme (SGP).
We turn now to the evaluations of this programme to look at whether this provides a
promising avenue for civil society engagement in climate action.
The SGP was established in 1992 and implemented by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) on behalf of the Global Environment Facility
(GEF). SGP provides small grants of up to US$50,000 to local communities as they
take action on sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity, climate change,
land degradation, international waters, sustainable forest- and chemical manage-
ment. SGP has provided over 18,000 grants to communities in more than 125 coun-
tries. In its fifth operational phase (2011–2014), the Programme’s aim included
expanding its coverage to 136 countries. US$288.28 million was allocated to the
SGP and total co-financing mobilized from diverse sources amounts to US$345.24
million (GEF/IEO and UNDP/IEO 2015, p. 1).
From 2013 to 2015, the GEF and UNDP Independent Evaluation Offices jointly
evaluated SGP. One of the conclusions of the evaluation states that ‘SGP continues
to support communities with projects that are effective, efficient, and relevant in
achieving global environmental benefits while addressing livelihoods as well as
promoting gender equality and empowering women’ (GEF/IEO and UNDP/IEO
2015, p. xiii). The evaluation further notes that SGP’s system ensures global
policies are translated into action at the local level. The results at local level were
impressive, with high percentages of projects that contributed to livelihoods,
poverty reduction and gender.
In many countries, SGP achievements were replicated, upscaled and
mainstreamed, sometimes to the extent of policy influence, into local and some-
times national development processes. Replication often takes place on a local scale
only: other villages and communities copying what had been achieved in a specific
SGP supported activity. Thus, successful introduction of conservation of mangrove
forests in Senegal at the local community level was replicated in other villages.
Mainstreaming happened less often, but an interesting example was an SGP grant in
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Uganda to initiate behaviour change in local communities on the waste they
produced and to take responsibility for this waste, rather than to expect the
government to remove it. This behaviour change was then promoted throughout
Uganda, supported amongst others by the World Bank (Examples from GEF/IEO
2015, p. 18). However, broader adoption at the national and regional levels tends to
run into obstacles – success is most prevalent at local levels (GEF/IEO 2015, p. 19).
The micro-macro paradox is therefore also visible in civil society involvement and
action. Successes at the local level do not necessarily translate to national and
regional levels, even though these successes evidently “extend beyond the project
level” (GEF/IEO 2015, p. 19).
One can also see the SGP success with a bottom up approach as it contributes to
numerous institutional and policy changes at the local, provincial, and national
levels, and to building capacities within civil society and academic organizations to
address global environmental concerns. Its success has resulted in a high demand
for support (GEF/EO 2010, p. 18).
This is further demonstrated in a regional GEF project in the Pacific on Biodi-
versity Conservation7 which aimed to introduce community based conservation
approaches throughout the Pacific Islands. This approach, focusing on solving land-
use problems between villages, while integrating livelihood issues in local conser-
vation planning, is now in use throughout the Pacific and has been successfully
adapted to local circumstances. However, evaluative evidence in Vanuatu shows
that success in communities does not (yet) equal success at the national level, as the
government has not been able to dedicate resources to institutionalize the new
approach (and with the devastation caused by Cyclone Pam in 2015, it may take
extra time before the approach can be integrated in its national policies).
Evaluative evidence thus shows that the bottom-up activism of civil society
organisations and local communities, when supported with focused funding as
provided by the Small Grants Programme of the GEF, can be successful and
provide solutions that can be incorporated at national and even regional scale.
However, the micro-macro paradox is also evident at this level and additional
action is required to achieve broader adoption and systems change.
2.7 Introducing New Technologies Through the Private
Sector
There is wide-spread agreement that climate action involves a substantial and
transformative technological overhaul of production processes in the private sector.
Innovation, together with the promotion, development and transfer of environmen-
tally sound technologies, and uptake of these in the private sector is critical in
enabling countries to combat climate change and to pursue their sustainable
7GEF ID 403.
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development objectives. This can mean using renewable energy or transforming
current equipment or technologies into something that is cleaner and more climate-
resilient. This is reflected in the comprehensive evaluations: the introduction of
technology scores high in the support provided by the organisations evaluated.
Since 1991, the GEF has been facilitating technology transfer to support devel-
oping countries through know-how, goods and services, equipment, as well as
organizational and managerial procedures. The GEF has invested around US$250
million annually8 in, among others, energy efficiency, renewable energy, emerging,
low carbon and energy generating technologies and sustainable urban transport.
In July 2008, World Bank Executive Directors approved the establishment of the
Clean Technology Fund (CTF), under the Climate Investment Funds (CIF). CTF is
a US$5.6 billion fund that empowers the transformation in middle income and
developing countries by providing resources to scale up the demonstration, deploy-
ment and transfer of low carbon technologies with significant potential for long-
term greenhouse gas (GHG) emission savings.9 Although implementation is still at
its early stages, CTF investment plans, if successful, would boost renewable energy
generation capacity or reduce national power consumption by 1–8%. CTF funding
for concentrated solar power, if successful, could boost total global capacity by
more than 40%.
In 2012, with financing from the GEF and in collaboration with the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Asian Development Bank
established the Climate Technology Finance Center (CTFC). The Center is
designed to promote transfer of and investment in climate technologies and to
help mainstream climate technology considerations in development planning.
Since inception, the Center has provided lessons on climate change initiatives to
other multilateral development banks (MDBs) (ADB 2014).
While other organisations may not have dedicated instruments for technology
transfer, they show a similar emphasis on innovation and introduction of technol-
ogies, especially in collaboration with the private sector. Evaluative evidence in the
seven comprehensive evaluations focuses on the following issues.
Technologies That Work Best Tend to Be Already Tested Elsewhere A lot of
technology transfer has been successful precisely because it was focused on well
proven technologies. Replication was typically taken on by the private sector as a
result of evidence showing that a technology was both cost-effective and profitable.
Sound monitoring that demonstrates the benefits of a technology becomes even
more important to its broader adoption (GEF/IEO 2014, p. 54). CTFC experience
showed that many country governments do not give high priority to the introduction
of relatively high-cost climate change risk reduction technologies. As a result,
CTFC undertook a phased approach whereby it is required to first demonstrate
8Global Environment Facility (2016) Technology Transfer for Climate Change. https://www.
thegef.org/gef/technology_transfer. Accessed 20 April 2016.
9Climate Investment Funds (2016) Clean Technology Fund. https://www-cif.
climateinvestmentfunds.org/fund/clean-technology-fund. Accessed 20 April 2016.
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benefits to countries (ADB/IED 2014, p. 21). The Report on Effectiveness of the
Swiss International Cooperation in Climate Change (2014, IV) highlighted that
groups of projects with strong scores for mitigation effectiveness were found to
include projects that targeted the rehabilitation of hydropower systems and power
systems with direct energy efficiency benefits and enabling impacts for renewable
energy promotion, the strengthening of measuring, reporting and verification
capacity and carbon market readiness, the use of knowledge sharing among cities
and companies, and the rehabilitation and re-deployment of used Swiss trams to
other countries.
A Fully Supportive Enabling Environment Is Necessary W€orlen’s (2014) meta-
analysis of mitigation interventions led to a systematic overview of all the barriers
to change – providing a “theory of no change” – an explanation of why market
change or transformation was not happening. The theory of no change demon-
strated that introduction of technology will only be successful if all potential
barriers for change have been tackled. The ICF evaluation showed that in more
than half of CTF countries, policy, regulatory, and macroeconomic situations have
the potential to slow down or limit transformation and replication. These countries
have supportive policies in place that provide building blocks, but lack
implementing regulations specifying key details of the regulatory environment,
weakening the potential for immediate replication. Non-investment-grade credit
ratings are also a limiting factor in some countries (ICF 2014, X). ADB’s Climate
Technology Finance Center (CTFC) also encountered difficulties during its design
and launch. Barriers include financial constraints, insufficient knowledge base and
expertise, and inadequacies of public policies, regulations, and enforcement
(ADB/IED 2014, p. 21).
A Crucial Supporting Factor Is the Availability of Financing If loans for invest-
ment in new technology are unavailable, then this technology will not be widely
adopted. The Fifth Overall Performance Study of the GEF (2014) showed that
mainstreaming typically took place because of financial incentives provided by the
national government to adopt the technologies (p. 54). The IDB/OVE evaluation
notes that promoting the development of small-scale energy efficiency projects has
proven to be more difficult, as small firms face high transaction costs and low
financial returns from these investments (partly because of energy subsidies), and
they require access to long-term financing (2014, p. 67).
The CIF evaluation could not see a clear path towards broader adoption of many
technologies tested and demonstrated in CIF support, because these projects and
programmes lacked a convincing theory of change that would explain how repli-
cation and market change and transformation would take place. This seems at least
partly due to investment criteria, for example in CTF, that focus on quantifying
GHG emission reductions rather than causal pathways to transformative change
(ICF 2014, x). The focus on GHG emission reductions is visible in other evaluations
as well – it points to the possibility that technology is easier judged on its
contribution to climate change mitigation, without full recognition that any
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technology will only perform if the social, economic and environmental prerequi-
sites are in place over time.
2.8 Gender, Equity and Inclusiveness
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,10 adopted at the Earth
Summit in 1992, introduced principles (10, 20, 21, 22) on participation and
importance of specific groups (civil society, women, youth and indigenous groups)
for sustainable development. The Sustainable Development Goals recognize that
society and the economy need to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth,
attention for gender perspectives and ensure inclusiveness of both civil society
and the private sector, as well as government. Achieving this will ensure sustainable
development in the social and economic domains. Without this balance, the balance
of social and economic needs with the environmental domain will be meaningless.
Climate change impacts affect men and women, with the poorest being the most
vulnerable. Seventy percent of the world’s poor are women,11 making them
extremely affected. On the other hand, they also play a large and important role
in tackling climate change. As impacts of climate change increase, work predom-
inantly undertaken by women (i.e. food production, supplying household water,
ensuring fuel for heating and cooking) is becoming increasingly more difficult.
Coping strategies and their resilience give them a practical understanding of
innovation and skills to adapt to changing realities, as well as contribute to finding
solutions.
The GEF has recognized gender as highly important to achieve behavioural
change that will lead to broader adoption of sustainable solutions to global envi-
ronmental problems. In 2010, OPS4 highlighted that ‘social and gender issues in
GEF strategies and projects are not addressed systematically, and the GEF cannot
rely completely on the social and gender policies of its Agencies.’ (GEF/EO 2010,
p. 30). As a response, the GEF developed its policy on gender mainstreaming and
adopted it in May 2011. There has also been an increase in the proportion of
projects that aim to mainstream gender. These improvements may be attributed to
adoption of gender mainstreaming by several GEF agencies, of which the best
international practices come from IFAD, UNDP and the World Bank. Despite the
adoption and review of a gender policy and designation of a focal point OPS5
provides evaluative evidence that attention for gender in projects is often lacking.
No less than 43 projects evaluated qualified themselves as “gender not relevant”,
10United Nations Environment Programme (2003). Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment. http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid¼78& articleid¼1163.
Accessed 12 May 2016.
11United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2014) Gender and Climate Change.
http://unfccc.int/gender_and_climate_change/items/7516.php. Accessed 19 April 2016.
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but provided evidence that gender turned out to be relevant after all. OPS5 con-
cluded that “omitting attention for gender where it is needed may have led to
unintended negative gender-related consequences”. A baseline study undertaken
by OPS5 revealed that many climate action projects were formulated by experts
insufficiently aware of gender issues. On the good side it should be noted that the
same study also revealed projects that tackle gender issues adequately (GEF/IEO
2014, p. 61).
When the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) started in 2008, they did not have an
explicit gender focus – most countries did not include women’s organisations in
investment plan consultations. However, in 2009 and 2010, 15% of the plans
started declaring gender considerations. Some works remains to ensure that gender
considerations are mainstreamed in CIF planning and carried through to investment
projects in the field. In a positive step forward, the CIF hired a gender specialist to
develop and implement an action plan to support collaboration among MDBs.
Attempts have been made throughout the NICFI portfolio to address gender
issues in REDDþ. However, it is stated by the evaluation that among partners, there
is a lack of understanding of, and low general capacity to address gender. The
strongest contribution has been through the UN-REDD programme, whereby
numerous publications on REDDþ and gender have been produced.
For UN-REDD, the importance and need for gender mainstreaming is reflected
in most of its policy and programmatic documents and guidelines. However, the
implementation of gender mainstreaming activities at the country level is not taking
place in a cohesive and systematic way throughout the programme. The evaluation
(2014) stated that drivers of deforestation will be better addressed if gender
considerations are integrated especially at the local level.
The track record on equity and inclusiveness is even less impressive. While
equity and inclusiveness are essential dimensions of social, economic and environ-
mental sustainability, they are perhaps too far removed from the often technical
nature of the climate actions reviewed in the seven comprehensive evaluations. The
Fifth Overall Performance Study of the GEF does not mention equity or inclusive-
ness, while the CIF evaluation only mentions equity in relation to investments and
inclusiveness of stakeholders in consultations. There is indirect attention to the
issues – for example in the attention for local livelihoods, involvement of indige-
nous peoples and civil society organisations. An example is to be found in the
NICFI evaluation: since 2008, NICFI provided a total of NOK 1 billion or 9% of its
funding to civil society to generate needed knowledge, for advocacy (international
and political), piloting and facilitating implementation (Frechette etc. 2014, xix).
UN-REDD’s evaluation stated that ‘The Programme provides an enabling platform
for Indigenous Peoples and civil society organisations to influence global discus-
sions on REDDþ. The ability of forest-dependent populations to influence REDDþ
processes has so far proven to be more limited at the country level, and
non-indigenous communities are not well represented in the programme, overall’
(Frechette etc. 2014, vi).
While attention for gender, equity and inclusiveness is on the rise, the evaluative
evidence is overwhelming that these dimensions have not yet been fully included in
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climate action. With the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, this has
become more important and we hope to see evaluative evidence emerging the
coming decade.
2.9 When Will We Achieve Systems Change?
The comparison of the seven comprehensive evaluations published in 2014, and
some influential evaluations from the years before, leads to the conclusion that if we
want to achieve transformational change, we need to ensure that the impact drivers
working towards such a change are stronger than the impact drivers that cause
climate change. An important part of the fight to mitigate climate change is
therefore outside of climate change action: continue the fight against public subsi-
dies for non-sustainable use of natural resources; take action to ensure that the costs
of climate change are paid for by the “polluters”, by industries and people who are
causing climate change to happen. Until that time climate change action will consist
of beautiful flowers in a walled garden: just a demonstration that we can have a
beautiful planet, if only the winds blowing against us would not destroy these
beautiful flowers if they emerge from the walled garden.
The conclusions we draw from the seven comprehensive evaluations are as
follows.
1. The OPS5 conclusion that a high percentage of climate action is effective is
supported by all other comprehensive evaluations that have been able to look at
effectiveness;
2. For reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the energy sector and energy policies
hold greatest promise, and tackling energy efficiency issues is more effective
than support for renewable energy, but the latter is effective as well, even if
costlier.
3. Subsidies for non-sustainable use of natural resources (fossil fuels, agricultural
practices, overuse of water resources, etc.) prevent the reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions to have more than a marginal impact on climate change: i.e. the
pace of climate change is slowed almost imperceptibly.
4. The micro-macro paradox is thus shown to exist: anything the international
organizations and the bilateral donors do to prevent climate change continues
to be effective in its own right, but powerless against the enormous spending
power and damage done by subsidies for non-sustainable use of natural
resources, with fossil fuel subsidies as the largest barrier to change.
5. To change the system, action from many partners, bottom-up and top-down, with
full recognition of cross-cutting issues such as gender, equity, inclusiveness is
needed, and evaluative evidence shows that pieces of the puzzle are known and
can be effectively set up and used.
6. To change the system, an important input of technology is needed – the shift
from fossil fuels to a low-carbon economy needs technological innovation and
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change. The technologies to do this exist and need to be fostered and promoted:
evaluative evidence shows that when they are introduced properly and supported
by all actors, they can be effective fertilizers of change.
7. On adaptation to climate change many promising evaluative findings are emerg-
ing; what is lacking is a concentrated effort to gather the evaluative evidence and
interpret it, learn at higher levels of aggregation and integrate adaptation into
social, economic and environmental development as the essential ingredient that
will ensure sustainability.
2.10 Recommendations for Future Evaluations
As argued in van den Berg (2013, p. 47), evaluations of climate change interven-
tions, especially if they aim for a higher more comprehensive level of understand-
ing what the interventions mean and what they achieve in the longer run, need
to evaluate in the context of the continuing societal and economic winds that are
causing climate change. Evaluators need to point out to policy makers and decision
makers that what they promote with one hand, is more than sufficiently undone with
a very active and much bigger other hand.
If the forces of destruction can be reduced or even halted, climate change action
will become successful. How successful can currently not be established fully for
all actions – there is some international agreement on measurement of reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions, but this agreement needs to be further developed. Many
countries, multilateral and bilateral organizations are currently using various mea-
surement systems at the same time in different projects – this needs to be improved.
Evaluations, not just the seven comprehensive ones, but the many evaluations at
the intervention level as well (many of which are highlighted in this book), provide
an increasing body of knowledge that has been insufficiently explored for policy
makers and decision makers on what works, where and when and for whom under
what circumstances. This should focus on:
• How systems change can be effected through activities on key issues that will
“tip” or “tilt” the system in the right direction;
• Identify the top-down actions that can and should be taken as they have proven
to be effective; similarly look at bottom-up actions that can and should be
supported;
• Present evidence on the difference in effectiveness between inclusive, gender
sensitive, equity based approaches versus approaches that lack these
perspectives;
• Contribute to a repository of evidence on which technologies under which
circumstances, for whom, have proven to be effective in supporting more
sustainable and low-carbon growth;
• Contribute to a repository of evidence on what works for whom, when, where,
and under which circumstances on adaptation to climate change.
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The evaluation departments of countries, bilaterals and international organiza-
tions, as well as philanthropic foundations and private and social enterprises should
increase their collaboration, as the war on climate change requires a concentrated
effort, rather than everybody focusing on their own constituency and their own
accountability. Your children and your children’s children will one day ask you, as
an evaluator, what you have done to stop climate change. Your response should not
be that you have provided evidence to your government or Board on how the money
was spent, but on what is useful and a potential winner in our battle to keep the
planet habitable for humankind.
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